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General Surmnary
IN retrospect, it seems that among the deficiencies in Irish
economic policy in the early and mid-’fiMes were: (i) Failure
to reorientate sufficiently Irish industry, and to promote
services such as tourism, toward export markets after the period
of growth via import substitution (the mid-’twenties to the
’fifties) had tapered off, and (ii) Failure to maintain, by fiscal
measures, a high level of domestic demand. The extreme
openness of tile economy is a feature to be recalled: imports
since 1947 have averaged over 40 per cent of GNP at factor
cost. Despite import substitution, imports, and the ratio of
imports to GNP, had risen between the ’thirties and the ’fifties.
In the absence of considerable foreign borrowing (which,
apparently for nationalistic reasons, successive governments
discouraged) increased demand for imports, necessary for, as
well as generated by, income growth, could not be satisfied
without placing stress on balance of payments constraints on
domestic expansion. Fear of adverse international payments
balances was, in fact, the principal rationale for the deflationary
fiscal policies of the ’tiMes.
In the nine years 195o/58
, 
the economy expanded at an
average real annual rate of about one per cent. It was against
this background of stagnation, coupled with the highest
emigration rates of the century, that the need for fundamental
changes in policy was seen in the late ’fifties.
In contrast to tile preceding years, the period since the late
’fifties saw, in summary: (i) Greater realisation at policy levels
that rapid growth in exports of goods and services was a
necessary condition for faster growth in real income. Accord-
ingly, economic policy, in particular, fiscal policy, became
much more export orientated. Increasing exports were both a
vii
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source of growth (via their effects on aggregate demand) and a
condition for growth (by easing balance of payments constraints
on domestic expansion). (ii) A change in official attitudes
toward borrowing abroad, whether by way of ownership by
foreigners of industry in Ireland, or by Government borrowing
in foreign capital markets. As the bulk of the output from new
foreign-owned industry was for export, considerations (i) and
(ii) are not independent. (iii) Expansionary domestic fiscal
policies : because of the high marginal propensity to import and
balance of payments constraints, this stimulation of domestic
demand would not in practice have been possible in the absence
of the chaiages in (i) and (ii).
Growth in the economy since I958 has been at an average
real annual rate of about 4 per cent. The objective of this paper
is not to congratulate policymakers for this growth, but rather,
to focus on methodological deficiencies in their approaches to
economic planning and policy formation since the late ’fifties.
We begin with a survey of the modern theory of economic
policy. This body of analysis is concerned with the consistency
and feasibility of plans and with the optimality of economic
policy actions. It highlights the fact that the policy instruments,
rather than the targets, are the ultimate unknowns in any
policy problem. The survey provides the vantage point for
much of what follows. The theory leads to the conclusions that
in order to attain any number of targets, policymakers must
generally employ at least as many policy instruments; also,
since a given instrument is likely to affect many target variables,
the policy instruments should be co-ordinated. Furthermore,
recognising that normally policymakers are not free to vary
instruments arbitrarily and that they operate in a world of
uncertainty, leads to the conclusion that the more policy
instruments available, the better--even if policymakers already
have as many instruments as targets. Finally, uncertainty does
not destroy the case for planning; it merely changes the form
which planning should take.
It seems to us that few Irish policymakers have ever tried to
viii
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analyse the formal structure of an economic policy problem;
had they done so, it is unlikely that they would have behaved
in the way they did. Setting up a list of objectives without
indicating how they are to be attained does not constitute a
policy or plan; it is, rather, a statement of mere aspirations. In
many respects, that is the approach we have tended to adopt in
Ireland. In focusing on objectives (targets) rather than on
policy instruments, we have tended to view economic policy
with its head upside down. For example, the methodological
work in designing the Second and Third Programmes was
overwhelmingly concerned with making consistent projections
of the economy rather than with analysing how the targets
could be attained.
Turning to the short-run, the poor quality of our national
income statistics is noted. Nevertheless, it is argued that the
cumulative short-run effects of fiscal policy accounted for a very
considerable part of the real growth in the economy in the
period under review. Since balanced budget multipliers for
Ireland are extremely low, the bulk of this growth is attribut-
able to the capital budgets. Less of a concrete nature cart be
said about monetary policy. That is because the Central Bank,
until the ’seventies, was very poorly equipped with statutory
policy instruments by means of which it could implement
effective monetary policies. In particular, the Bank had no legal
power to impose minimum reserve or liquidity ratios ort the
commercial banks. It is concluded, in this context, that in so far
as monetary matters were concerned, short-run economic
policy in Ireland was, until recently, inefficiently pursued.
Because the Bank had little power to use effective policy
instruments, some important instruments could not be em-
ploycd in the pursuit of national economic objectives.
An exercise in financial programming involves analyses of
the monetary and fiscal implications of attaining medium-term
and longer-run objectives. Thus, it is concerned with the
formulation of financial policies over time rather than mere
target setting. The three Irish medium-term programmes to
ix
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date are analysed in the context of financial programming. It is
concluded that scant attention has been paid to this important
matter in Ireland. This is reflected in the target orientation
rather than the policy orientation of the Second and Third
Programmes. It is argued that had the financial implications
of the three programmes been adequately analysed (and, in
consequence, the complementary policy alternatives been
highlighted) the need for additional monetary policy instru-
ments would almost certainly have been seen at an early stage;
also, the importance of co-ordination in monetary and fiscal
policies would have been underlined.
Failures in financial programming also brought potential
problems in Debt management. It seems that, until recently,
little attempt was made to create a graduated structure in the
maturity of the National Debt. The resulting bunching meant
that relatively large amounts could fall due for repayment and
refunding at any one time. Such bunching could interfere with
the operation of short-run monetary policies. On 31 March,
1974, the total offcial National Debt was over £1,622 million.
Of this, about £1,454 million was internal, while over £167
million was borrowed abroad. Almost one half of the official
Debt will mature in the five years to 31 March, 1979. It is
understood that attempts have been made in recent years to
effect a graduated structure in the official Debt. As, however,
bunching can be eliminated only in the longer-run, the present
problem in this respect possibly reflects failures in consciously
attempting to avoid such bunching in the not so recent past.
What we call the unoffcialNational Debt is of greater concern
to us. In Ireland, these State liabilities are normally forgotten
about in discussions of "the National Debt". Our classification
"unofficial" reflects the fact that the official Debt understates
State liabilities. When, for example, a public enterprise
negotiates a loan abroad, the resulting liabilities are not
reckoned as part of the National Debt. The State does, how-
ever, guarantee such loans. Such external borrowing by public
enterprises has been rising very rapidly in recent years. How-
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ever it seems that, until i974, nobody in the public service had
analysed the maturity structure of these "unofficial ’ external
debts. The dangers are clear: unless we have conscious co-
ordination to create a graduated structure in the total externally
borrowed National Debt (which includes the rapidly increasing
external liabilities of public enterprises) we are in danger of
reaching a situation in which very substantial sums unexpect-
edly fall due for repayment abroad in a given year. To avoid
such a situation and its possible consequences, we require
greater co-ordination between the Department of Finance, the
public enterprises, and the Central Bank.
As in longer-run matters, there has been serious lack of
co-ordination in short-run monetary and fiscal policies. The
fact that the commercial banks did not feel that they ought
decline government requests for additional credit was one of the
reasons why the credit advice by the Central Bank to the banks
since the mid-’sixties had only very limited success. This was
the very antithesis of co-ordination in monetary and fiscal
policy. It seems to us that the Bank, in the ’sixties, was expected
to act as a rubber stamp for government policies.
The final topic taken up is whether or not we should have
another national plan, and if so, what form such programming
should take. The need for some form of national planning
beyond the fiscal year is obvious when we bear in mind that
policy actions today have consequences in future years, while
the attainment of objectives in future years requires policy
actions in the current year. Two questions are of particular
relevance: (i) what should the time horizon ofthe practical
planner be and (ii) how should he take account of uncertainty?
With a rolling plan, the plan, for a given number of years, is
revised at the end of each year and an additional year is added
to the list. The effect of such revision is always to maintain a
planning horizon of approximately fixed length. Both theor-
etical and immediately practical issues lead us to conclude that
considerations of intertemporal dependence, combined with
the uncertainties underlying Irish planning (due in large
xi
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measure to the openness of the economy), present a very strong
case for the adoption of rolling plans with a time horizon of
about four years to the (rolling) terminal date. Such rolling
plans would however, have to be integrated in some (relatively
loose) perspective planning framework. Thus, contrary to what
appears to be the view in certain official circles, the existence of
uncertainty does not imply that planning cannot be pursued
effectively.
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Introduction
Tn~. theme of this paper--"Problems in Economic Planning
and Policy Formation in Ireland, i958-i974"--is rather
broad. There will, however, be a common unifying thread,
namely, the modern theory of economic policy. What we shall
do, in essence, is evaluate economic planning and policy
formation in Ireland from the vantage point of that body of
analysis. This, in turn, will highlight the methodological
deficiencies of our approach to policy. An attempt is made to
remain relatively non-technical. Because of this, and because
we do wish to be practical, some of our analysis--in particular,
that pertaining to decision-making over time under conditions
of uncertainty--will necessarily lack the rigour demanded by a
pure theorist.
Some remarks before proceeding. This paper is critical
rather than complimentary. That is because the success of
economic policies in Ireland since i958 is reasonably well
known. To dwell on such matters would, from the standpoint of
bringing about fundamental changes in our approach to policy,
be redundant. On the other hand, by focusing on the major
methodological deficiencies of our approach, it is hoped that
fresh thinking will be stimulated at the policy formation levels,
thereby leading to action to rectify those deficiencies.1
1Some of the arguments outlined below were independently advanced by
Kieran A. Kennedy in "The Irish Economy: The Challenges and Options",
~¢anagement, Journal of the Irish Management Institute, May 1974. Thus, Kennedy
writes (p. 60): "There is little point in planning when there are no policies to
ensure that the plan will be implemented. Planning in future should be concerned
as much with how things should be done as with what should be done." This
concurrence is not purely coincidental. It is, rather, a reflection of the urgent
need for serious re-appraisal of our approach to economic policy in Ireland.
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1. The Theory of Economic Policy
E CONOMIC policy consists in the deliberate variation ofinstruments to attain certain objectives. Turn first to the
theory of economic policy. The modern theory of economic
policy is concerned with the consistency and feasibility of
plans and, under various assumptions, with the optimality of
economic policy actions. This body of analysis, which is
essentially mathematical-logical, was developed by Jan
Tinbergen, Bent Hansen, and Henri Theil in the ’fifties and
was subsequently extended by major advances in control and
systems engineering.
The three basic ingredients of the static theory of economic
policy are:
(i)The objectives of the policymaker. These may be of a fixed
or flexible kind. In the former, the objective is to attain
fixed targets; in the latter, instrument values are
chosen so as to maximise some objective function.
(ii)A model of the economy. This may exist formally on paper
or merely in the policymaker’s mind. Four kinds of
variables may enter the structural equations of the
model:
(a) Instrument or Control or Policy Variables; exogenous
variables subject to direct control by the policy-
maker. A list of possible examples might include,
along with various categories of government
expenditure, tax rates, minimum liquidity require-
ments on the banking system, the exchange rate,
and so on. The definition categorically rules out
certain variables, such as a budget deficit, which
3
are often erroneously described as instruments,
from being true instruments of policy.
(b)Data, or Uncontrollable Exogenous Variables; exogen-
ous variables which the policymaker cannot
control, either directly or indirectly. In the ease of
a small economy like Ireland, foreign prices of
most manufactured goods, being in effect beyond
the direct or indirect control or influence by Irish
policymakers, would be considered as data.
(c) Target, or State Variables; endogenous variables,
the values of which yield utility (or disutility) to
the policymaker. He may be able to control these
variables indirectly, via the instruments. The level
of real income and the balance of international
payments are standard examples of target variables
in economic policy models.
(d) The Irrelevant Variables; endogenous variables the
values of which yield no utility (or disutility) to
the policymaker. Which variables are considered
as irrelevant depend on the particular policy
problem on hand. If, for example, a policymaker
sought a certain target level of GNP and a certain
balance of international payments deficit, and if
he were unconcerned with the size of the budget
deficit implied by the use of instruments in
purstfing those two objectives, then the budget
deficit would be regarded as an irrelevant variable
in the policy problem on hand.
(iii)Boundary conditions. There may be a set of boundary
conditions, or constraints, on the admissible values of
the instruments. For example, in countries where the
international rate of exchange is actually regarded as a
4
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policy instrument, considerations of tradition or
"prestige" may prevent the exchange rate from moving
outside certain bounds.
The appr+ach of the static theory of economic policy to any
particular decision problem (such as drawing up a one year
plan~ is typically as follows: the targets are normally assumed
given. Given that the target variables have fixed values in the
structural equations to which we have already referred, the
policy problem collapses into finding a set of values for the
instrument variables which satisfy those structural equations.
If no such solution exists, then the problem must, in practice,
be changed, often by dropping the less urgent targets, or,
alternatively, by solving for that set of instrument values which
maximises the policymaker’s preference function. In either case,
the approach highlights the fact that the instruments are the ultimate
unknowns in any consistent policy problem. Greater awareness of
this fact would frequently prevent policymakers from pursuing
targets which, given the instruments employed, are logically
inconsistent; secondly, even if the targets are consistent, it
would enable decision-makers attain those targets more
efficiently.
Some elaboration on the preceding two paragraphs--in
particular, of what we mean by a "consistent" policy problem--
may be desired. Further discussion on this matter, which is
necessarily technical, is deferred to Appendix I.
The main conclusions from the static theory of economic
policy are as follows :z
2See W. C. Brainard, "Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of Policy", American
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May I967; K. Fox, J. Sengupta, and
E. Thorbeeke, The Theory of Quantitative Economic Policy, North-Holland, I966;
Bent Hansen, The Economic Theory of Fiscal Policy, Allen and Unwin, I958
, 
and
Lectures in Economic Theory, Part II, The Theory of Economic Policy and Planning,
Studentlitteratur, Lund, Sweden, i967; L. Johansen, Public Economics, North-
Holland, 1965; E. Malinvaud, "First Order Certainty Equivalence", Econo-
metrica, October, 1969; H. Theil, Optimal Decisions for Government and Industry,
North-Holland, I964; J. Tinbergen, On the Theo~ of Economic Policy, North-
Holland, x 952, Centralization and Decentralization in Economic Policy, North-Holland,
1954, and Economic Policy: Principles and Design, North-Holland, I956.
5
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(I) In order to attain any number, say Ac targets, decision-makers
must, in general, employ at least JV instruments.8 Furthermore, if
there are boundary conditions on the admissible values of the
instruments it may be absolutely necessary, in order to attain
N targets, to employ more than N instruments. However, even
in the absence of boundary conditions, a mere excess of instru-
ments over targets does not guarantee that the targets cart be
attained. Nevertheless, the more instruments that are available, the
more likely it will be that all targets can be attained. It may be well to
point out that, even if perfect foresight were to prevail, the use
of more instruments than strictly necessary may be recom-
mended. Not only will it then be possible to avoid some of the
difficulties imposed by boundary conditions, but also the
"pressure" on the population may be more evenly distributed;
for example, by employing a number of different kinds of
taxation, efforts to avoid payment of taxes may be averted.
Evidently, these are other targets, assumed implicitly.
(2) The instruments--and we wish to emphasise this--must
be co-ordinated. That is because each instrument will normally affect
many, and possibly all, target variables. Therefore, unless the
ec6nomy has a peculiar recursive structure, or causal ordering,4
some policy instruments should not, in general, be assigned to
one decision-making body, such as a central bank, while at the
same time others are assigned to another decision-making
agency, such as a department of finance, without providing for
continuous consultation and co-ordination between the two
decision-making agencies. There are several studies in the
aWe cannot, however, exclude the possibility that sets with fewer instruments
than targets may be feasible, though such cases are likely to be rare. Those rare
cases can occur when one target is automatically attained with the attainment
of another. The structure of the system may also be such that two targets are
incompatible, even if there are no boundary conditions on the instruments and
one has the same number of instruments as targets. (This would imply that, given
the chosen values of the target variables, the structural equations are inconsistent.)
Discussion of these cases can be found in Bent Hansen, op. cir., x958 and I967.
ISee H. Simon, "Causal Ordering and Identifiability", Ch. 3 in W. Hood and
T. Koopmans, (eds.), Studies in Econometric Method, Cowles Commission Mono-
graph No. x4, Wiley, t953, and Bent Hansen, op. cir., I958 and x967.
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theoretical literature analysing the consequences of a depart-
ment of finance pursuing targets independently of"~6ntral
bank action, and vice versa. It has been demonstrated that
this may have disastrous consequences.5
(3) The third conclusion is that if, instead of attempting to
attain fixed targets, the policymakers seek to maxirnise some
preference functiofi, then the larger the number of relevant
instruments available, the better.
(4) The fourth conclusion recognises that policymakers
normally operate in a world of uncertainty. This uncertainty
may be of two principal forms:
(a) Uncertainty about the effects of the policymaker’s own
actions, i.e. of varying the instruments. He may, for
example, be uncertain of the multipliers applying to
changes in government expenditure or tax rates.
(b) Uncertainty about the data, i.e. those exogenous
variables not under the decision-maker’s control. Thus,
he may be uncertain of the state of foreign demand and
hence exports. There are theoretical reasons for believ-
ing that when the policymaker is faced with both these
forms of uncertainty, when he has more instruments
available than targets, and when he seeks to maximise
the expectation of some function of the target variables,
he should often use all the instruments he has available;
hence, the more instruments, the better he can per-
form.
The conclusions that at least N instruments must be employed
to attain N targets, and that the instruments must be co-
ordinated do not, as already indicated, hold without exception.
They are, however, sufficiently general to be considered
~See Bent Hansen, op, cir. x958
, 
and Robert MundeU, "The Appropriate Use
of Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Internal and External Stability", International
Monetary Fund Staff PalOers, March i96~.
7
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important rules of thumb. Thus, even if we know little about the
structure of the economy, linear or otherwise, "if actual policies
happen not to conform with these rules viz., the two conclusions
just repeated in the present paragraph, one should in general
suspect that something may be wrong with the policies".6
So far we have assumed that policy makers have a time
horizon of a single period. The theory of economic policy has,
however, been extended to optimal policy formation over
time,v using the techniques of control and systems engineering.
This body of analysis, which is highly technical, will not be
reviewed in detail here. Suffice it to say, that in the control and
systems theory approaches, the economy is represented by a set
of differential or difference equations in which the state of the
economy at any time depends on the state in the recent past
and on the controls (or instruments) applied in the recent past.
It has been shown that if certain mathematical conditions are
satisfied,8 there exists a path for the policy instruments over
time which will transfer the economy from any arbitrary initial
state to any arbitrary terminal state. Alternatively, if the
objective is to maximise the policymaker’s preference function
over time, the main body of control theory is concerned with
finding that sequence of instrument values which brings about
such a maximisation.9 Thus, like the static theory, the theory of
nBent Hansen, ot>. clt., x967, p. 5.
~See, for example, G. Chow, "Problems of Economic Policy from the Viewpoint
of Optimal Control", American Economic Review, December 1973; K. Arrow and
M. Kurz, Public Investment, the Rate of Return and Optimal Fiscal Policy, Johns Hopkim,
t97o; C. Holt, "Linear Decision Rules for Economic Stabilization and Growth",
Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1962; D. A. Livesey, "Control Theory
and Input-Output Analysis", International 3ournal of Systems Science, x97x, Vol. 2,
No. 3, PP. 3°7"318; R. S. Pindyck, "Art Application of the Linear Quadratic
Tracking Problem to Economic Stabilization Policy", Institute of Electrical a~d
Electronic Engineers, Transactions on Automatic Control, Vol. AC-x 7, No. 3, June 1972.
SSee M. Aoki, "Sufficient Conditions for Optimal Stabilisation Policies",
Review of ff.conomic Studies, January 1973; R. Brockett, Finite Dimensional Linear
Systems, Wiley, 197o; C. Desoer, aVotes for a Second Course on Linear Systems, Van
Nostrand Reinhold, x97o; S, Gershwin and D. Jacobson, "A Controllability
Theory for Non-linear Systems, with Applications", Technical Report No. 592,
Division of Engineering and Applied Physics, Harvard University, i969.
gFor a standard textbook exposition of the principal methods of optimal control
theory see, for example, A, Bryson and Y. Ho, Applied Optimal Control, Blaisdell,
t969.
I
I
I
I
economic policy over time focuses, in an ultimate sense, on the instruments
rather than on the targets.
Some final remarks regarding the theory of economic policy
over time concern the formulation of an optimal strategy in the
event of uncertainty. Suppose, as is quite common in practice,
that a policymaker must make decisions regarding the use of
instruments over a finite time period in order to maximise the
expectation of some objective function. Suppose, furthermore,
that the outcome of each decision (that is, the state of the system)
at each point in time is a vector of variables, some or all of them
random with given (possibly subjective) probability distribu-
tions. An important practical question, in such circumstances,
is: how should the rational decision-maker behave, or phrased
otherwise, what kind of control scheme (strategy for using
instruments) should he adopt? It is useful, in this context, to
distinguish between two kinds of control which can be envis-
aged. One is pure open-loop control, in which the optimal control
path is determined at the beginning, as a function of time.
Another type of control is pure closed-loop control, in which the
optimal sequence of controls is determined as a function of the
current state variables and time. By contrast to open-loop
control, in which all decisions are made in advance, in closed-
loop control the decisions may be revised in the light of new
information embodied in the current state variables; there is,
that is to say, feedback.
It is known from stochastic control theory1° that in a random
tmvironment, control schemes using optimal feedback are
preferable to optimal pure open-loop systems, in the sense that,
on average, they yield a higher value for the decision-maker’s
objective function. Therefore, if a rational policymaker seeks
x°See K. Astrom, Introduction to Stochastic Control Theory, Academic Press, x97o;
S. Dreyfus, Dynamic Programming and the Calculus of Variations, Chapter VII,
Academic Press, I965; S. Dreyfus, "Introduction to Stochastic Optlmisation and
Control", in Karreman (ed.), Stochastic Optimisation and Control, Wiley, x968;
H. Theil, op. dr.; H. Theil, "A Note on Certainty Equivalence in Dynamic
Planning", Econometrica, Vol. ~5, (x957), PP. 346"349; H. Theil, "Linear Decision
Rules for Macro-Dynamic Policy Problems", in B. Hickman (ed.), Quantitativa
Planning of Economic Policy, Brookings Institution, x965.
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to maximise the expected value of his preference function over
time, he should, if possible, devise a feedback control scheme.
~N6 can quickly outline some of the practical relevance of this
to economic planning. Consider a planner who, by manipula-
tion of policy instruments, seeks to maximise the expected
performance of the economy (as measured by the planner’s
preferences) over, say, a period of five years. His best strategy is
then approximately11 as follows. At time zero, the beginning of
the planning period, he should devise that five-year plan for
employment of policy instruments which seems best to him,
given the information available at time zero, and recognising
that he shall have opportunities to revise this plan at subsequent
points in time. At the beginning of the. second year he can
observe the state of the economy resulting from the first year’s
decisions and ranclom terms; also, his knowledge of the
distributions of the random variables may have improved over
time. These are new items of information not available at time
zero. At time one, the beginning of the second year, he should
devise that four-year plan for control of policy instrumexlts
which seems best to him, given the (increased) information he
has at the beginning of the second year, and recognising that
lag shall have opportunities to revise his plan at later dates. He
should plan, in like manner at the beginning of the third, fourth,
and fifth years. Thus, what is envisaged for rational behaviour
under circumstances of uncertainty and with a fixed terminal
calendar date is in fact a series of plans, formulated each year,
each plan encompassing the whole period which remains up to
the terminal date. By planning in this manner, the decision-maker
computes his expected future actions; hence, he will be able to make
preparations in advance. At the same time, however, he regularly revises
his plans to take account o fun foreseen initial conditions and the accumula-
tion of information over time.12
1aWe say "approximately" because our general description and specific termin-
ology are inexact--but we do not wish to be drawn into the detailed methodologies
of stochastic dynamic programming or of adaptive control theory; also, we do
wish to. be practical.
1"-For an application of the kind of procedure suggested in the last two sentences
of this paragraph, see the essay by H. Theil in B. Hiekmart (ed.), op. cir.
IO
Later in this paper we will make an important extension to
the above outline of the design of a rational strategy in an
environment of uncertainty. We will argue that policymakers
should not, in general, plan over a fixed calendar time period
(such as five calendar years) as was assumed above. :They
should, rather, add a year to the planning horizon everytime the
base year of the previous planning period elapses. Thus, we
will advocate what we call rolling plans. It will however bo
seen, when we come to discuss such rolling plans, that planners
should adopt a strategy very similar to that outlined above.
It may be felt that the theory of economic policy is so
abstract that it is irrelevant as a guide to decision-making by
real-world policymakers, or that they would need to hay eex ct large-scale od ls of the econom  before any empirical
.
relevance could be attached to the conclusions. Fortunately
,
such is not the case, for the theory leads to general qualitative,
rather than precise quantitative, conclusions concerning hov~
decision-makers must normally behave if they are rationally .to
pursue what they themselves have declared to be their object-
ives. Thus, the theory leads to a sensible method of thinking
about policy problems and a general guide to rational policy
action.
2. The Three Programmes for Economic Expansion:
Methodologies
A PLAN, if it is to be regarded as something more than mereaspiration, must focus on the policy instruments, rather
than on the targets as the ultimate unknowns in the planning
exercise?a Our policymakers in Ireland seem to have been
insufficiently aware of this fact, underlined in the theory of
economic policy. That is apparent from a quick survey of the
methodologies of the three Irish programmes.
The First Programme,14 I959/63, while devoting considerable
attention to the analysis of past policies, did not have a formal
planning methodology lying behind it.
The documents pertaining to the Second Programme15 i964/7o
,
were much more detailed. This was largely because (a) there
was more time to prepare the programme, work having begun
in January 1962
, 
and (b) the level of available technical
expertise had greatly increased. Two basic methodologies were
used in preparing the programme: (i) an iterative, material
balances, national accounts approach and (ii) the use of
economic models. The stated purpose of the exercises was to get
tSlt may be felt that this paper places too much emphasis on instruments and
too little on targets. It is generally true that neither the targets nor the instruments
are known when one sets out to design a plan. The immediate question then is:
What targets should be chosen? The set of targets is feasible only when, given
that those variables have their chosen values in the structural equations, a set
of instrument values can be found which satisfies those structural equations,
and the lzoundary conditions on instruments. It is in this sense that the instruments
are the ultimate unknowns. Research like that of Geary, Simpson and Henry
is important in deriving information for use in specifying sensible targets. See
R. G. Geary, "Towards an lnrmt-Output Decision Model for Ireland", Journal
of the Statistical and Social Inquiry S~ciety of lreland, x963-64; D. Simpson, A Medium-
Term Planning .Mtdelfor Ireland, Paper No. 4I, ESRI, Dublin, I968; E. Henry,
Irish Full Ew.ployment Structures, 1968 and x 975, Paper No. 74, ESRI, Dublin, x 974.
a~Programmefor Economic Expansion, Pr. 4796, Stationery Office, Dublin.
tSSecond Programme for Economic Expansion, Part I, Pr. 7239, and Part II, Pr. 767o~
Stationery Office, Dublin.
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a profile of the economy in i97o which reflected the highest
growth rate attainable in the light of policy possibilities, and on
assumptions regarding the external environment and resource
availability. Because (early in 1962) I96o was the latest year
for which reasonably firm statistics were available, 196o was
made a base year. The programming was done in terms of
196o prices, in the context of the ten years I96i/7o
, 
with 196o
as base.
The iterative method, employed in the Department of
Finance, proceeded by successive approximations. This method
is well known, so little time will be spent in describing it here.
It starts with a simple breakdown, e.g., of output or expendi-
ture and goes on to more detailed breakdowns. Initially, three
growth rates in GNP--3, 5, and 7 per cent a year in 196I/7°--
were taken, and, according to the methodological Appendix 5
of the Second Programme, Part II/~ the implications of each of
these for the main sectors were examined. According to the
same appendix, attention was then narrowed down to analysis
of the implications of a 5° per cent increase in real income over
the decade.
On the assumption of an overall output increase of 5° per
cent in the decade, projections of outputs in the main sectors
were made. In like manner, on the assumption of an overall
increase in real expenditure of 50 per cent, projections of the
main categories of expenditure were made. Thus, the role of
the iterative method in the Second Programme was in attempt-
ing to make consistent projections of material balances on the
assumption that the economy "would grow" by 5° per cent.
The advantage of the iterative method is that although tedi-
ous it is simple. The problem of feasibility aside, the over-
whelming disadvantage of the method is that it provides no way
of ensuring, given the base structure of the economy and its laws
of motion, that the various projections are logically consistent.
l*See, alternatively, W. J. L. Ryan, *’The Methodology of the Second Pro-
gramme for Economic Expanmo , Journal of the Statistical and Soo.ial Inqiti0
Society of Ireland, I963-64.
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As mentioned earlier, an economy and its evolution over time
can be represented by systems of equations. If a set of target
variables is specified, and if the structural equations (or equa-
tions of motion) satisfy certain conditions, then there exists at
least one set of instruments (or sequence of instrument vectors)
which enables all the targets to be attained, and the instrument
values which do this can normally be calculated. To check that
the targets are feasible, we then insure that the instruments
satisfy the boundary conditions. The iterative method, on the
other hand, implicitly assumes some (generally unspecified)
model of the economy. Full application of the method then
amounts to making an initial guess of a vector of unknowns which
satisfy the simultaneous (structural) equations. If, as is likely,
the first guess fails to yield a solution, the method then amounts
to making a second guess, and so on. But unlike some computer
algorithms, for example, the method has no built-in property
which ensures that the (in effect) sequence of guesses will
converge toward any of possibly many solutions. The use of
explicit formal models, on the other hand, both highlights the
assumptions, and normally surmounts the other deficiencies of
the iterative method.
We have already mentioned that formal models of the
economy were also employed as a methodological basis of the
Second Programme. These interesting models were developed
by R. C. Geary and others at The Economic and Social
Research Institute.17 Their main virtue, in our view, was that they
highlighted some of the important implications for policy--
above all, in so far "as the supremely important savings and
capital-output ratios were concerned--of actually attaining
macroeconomic targets. Thus, in explaining the work at The
Economic Research Institute, Geary reported that the principal
task was "to produce, on various hypothetical bases involving policy
decisions during the period from base to reference year (i.e.,
i96o to I97o), tables (i.e. projections) for the year of refer-
l~See R. C. Geary, op. tit.
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ence".TM It appears, nevertheless, that very little attention was
paid to those formal models, and that the iterative method of
the Department of Finance was regarded as overwhelmingly
the dominant basis in the design of the programme. The
assumptions made regarding the import ratio support that
conclusion. Thus, the projections in the programme documents
assumed that the import ratio (in 196o prices) would be 0.46
(the figure assumed in the iterative approach) in 197o. This
was considerably less than that assumed in Geary’s formal
macroeconomic model. Such serious underestimation of the
import ratio was one of the alleged reasons for scrapping the
programme in 1968.
Note that, up to now, we have referred to the methodological
basis of the Second Programme as being concerned primarily
with making projections of the national accotmts in the year
I97O. This is because the overwhelming emphasis in the
methodological exercises was on the consistency of a set of
material balances rather than on the economic policy question:
what sequence of vectors of policy instruments should be
employed in order that a specified set of targets shall be
attained (or, in theory, in order that a particular preference
function be maximised)? It seems, in fact, that the OECD
collective target of a 5° per cent real income increase for the
decade18a was assumed at an early stage, and the bulk of the
subsequent methodological work involved finding a set of (in
some sense) plausible sectoral growth rates consistent with the
overall increase. The view that the methodology of the Second
Programme was not sufficiently policy orientated is reinforced
when it is noted that neither Geary’s paper on the formal
models nor the (methodological) Appendix 5 of the pro-
gramme document made any reference to the monetary policy
instruments to be employed, while only vague references were
1BR. C. Geary, op. tit., p. 82. The emphasis and the parentheses have been
added by the present author.
_is In November 196x
, 
the member countries of the OECD adopted the target
o[ increasing their combined national output by 5° per cent during the decade
x96o/7o.
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made to fiscal policy, the chief one being that net indirect
taxes, just like GNP at factor cost, would increase by 5° per
centXg--almost as though that were some law of nature.
It may be objected that the Second Programme was, in fact,
more policy orientated than we have indicated. True, the
main texts of the programme documents made references to
fiscal policy. But, fiscal incentives for agriculture excepted,
these were vague, and ignored many important questions which
we shall tackle later.
The methodology used in establishing the quantitative
framework of the Third Programme2° broadly followed the
iterative projection-of-material-balances approach of the
Second Programme, i.e., a projection of supply over the
programme period was first made, demand patterns were then
considered, and, next, a reconciliation between the two was
effectcd. The I964 input-output table was then used to test
the consistency (rather than the feasibility) of the projections for
1972. The kinds of policy instruments to be used were similar
to those employed in the Second Programme, namely, a general
reliance on various fiscal incentives and expanded promotional
campaigns abroad. It would be difficult to deny, nevertheless,
that like its predecessor, the methodology of the programme
was projection-orientated rather than policy-orientated.
l),.7econd Programme, Part II, p. 312.
lUThird Programme, ’Economic and Social Development) 1969/7~, Prl. 43x, Stationery
Ollicc, Dublin.
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3. Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy in the Short Run
So far, we have dealt with the medium-tcrm, namely, theplanning periods of the three programmes. It may be
appropriate, before returning to questions of that character, to
pass some comment on the short-run effects of fiscal and
monetary policies.
Turn first to fiscal policy. In order to make sensible short-run
decisions, it is desirable that policymakers have some notion of
the effects of their policies. Knowledge of the effects of currently
proposed policies is frequently determined by estimating the
effects of similar measures in the past. In order to assess the
short-run effects ofmacroeconomic policies, one needs meaning-
ful national income statistics. Now national income is normally
defined as the total production of goods and services produced
by the community in a period of time, such as a year, given
certain definitions of what constitutes "production". It is a
reflection of the lack of concern with the short-run effects of
macroeconomic policies in the past that, even now, we do not
have meaningful national income figures for Ireland. Thus, the
official national income statistics as published in National
Income and Expenditure classify most of the private sector on the
basis of the calendar year, while, at the same time, the activities
of the public sector are classified on the basis of the fiscal year.
The sums of these two sets of figures are then presented as the
national income for a given year, which, of course, they
are not.21
Elsewhere22 we have attempted to assess the short-run effects
=ZThe national income estimates for I975, when they are eventually published,
will probably be on a more meaningful calendar year basis.
=~D. Norton, "Estimation of the Short-Run Effects of Fiscal Policy in Ireland,
x96o/x97o"
, 
Tile Economic and Social Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, April I975, and, for a
general non-technical discussion, "Fiscal Policy and Growth in an Open Economy:
The Case of Ireland", Public Finante/Finar~es Publiques, Volume XXIX, No. 2, 1974.
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of discretionary fiscal policy changes on two key-target variables,
real income and the balance of payments on current account.
It was found that, in the eleven years i96o/i97o
, 
fiscal policy in
Ireland was in fact unusually expansionary. This may seem
surprising, given that in the early years of the period under
review, the Minister for Finance seems to have accepted the
pre-Keynesian notion that the Current Budget should not
show a deficit. Thus, in his I96o Budget Statement, the
Minister remarked that "the year i959/6o ended with a
(Current Budget) surplus of ~I’2 million. It was not
spectacular . . . but . . . following immediately on the surplus
for i958/59, it is a welcome confirmation of the soundness of
our budgetary policy".~ Some comments in the I96i Budget
Statement are reminiscent of the erroneous pro-cyclical
thinking at public policy levels throughout most of the de-
veloped world in the ’thirties. In noting that due to unexpected
events the I96o Current Budget had shown a small deficit in
the out-turn, the Minister stated that "looking back over the
last three years, however, there is no cause for disappointment.
The (Current Budget) surpluses of I959 and I96o outweigh
the deficit of I96I. I need not reproach myself for the deficit
of I957/58. The Government entered office in March, I957,
and had to take the economic and financial situation very
much as they found it. The measures taken in 1957 (when the
economy was very depressed) to bring revenue and expenditure
into line and to revive economic activity could not be fully
effective at once"!~4 The I966 Current Budget Statement
seems to have been the first to recognise that planned deficits
may on occasion be desirable on economic grounds. It was not
until the I972 Budget that the first of such (current budget)
deficits was planned.
At an early stage in their university education, economics
students read that the simplest kind of balanced budget
~SBudget, 196o
, 
Stationery Office, Dublin, p. 6.
*4Budget, I96x
, 
Stationery Office, Dublin, p. xo. The words in parentheseS;
have been added by the present author.
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multiplier--the increment (decrement) in real income resulting
from a unit increase (decrease) in real government expenditure
simultaneously matched by an equal increase (decrease) in real
taxes--for a closed economy is unity. In the highly open
economy of Ireland, however, balanced budget multipliers in
the ’sixties were certainly well below unity~. But in contrast to
the Current Budget, the Capital Budget has been financed
primarily by borrowing, both at home and abroad. For a
variety of reasons, it appears that both the short-run and
long-run contributions to growth of the public capital pro-
gramme in the period under review were considerable.2n
Our estimates are that in i96o/i97o the average annual
effect on real GNP of discretionary changes in fiscal instruments
was an average annual increment in real GNP of about 1.9 per
cent, or close to one half of the average annual growth in the
economy in the period. Thus, the cumulative short-run effects
on real income of discretionary budget changes in the period
I96o/I97o equalled almost one half of the total growth in real
income in those years. These results were derived by con-
structing a short-run econometric model of the economy and
comparing the actual level of real income in each year with the
level of real income which would have prevailed had no changes
in discretionary budget measures been made in each year, over
~SPurely for purposes of ilhtstration, consider the simple model: (t) T=
C+I+G (2) C=o.9Td (3) Y~I=T--T. The variables are defined as follows:
T, national income; 2’1, personal disposable income; G, personal consumption
expenditure; I, private investment, G, government expenditure on goods and
services; T, total tax receipts. It can readily be calculated that if AG=-A T= x,
then AT=,. If we now extend this model to an open economy, (1) becomes
T=Cq-IWG-FX--A¢, where X and M denote, respectively, exports and imports
of goods and services. We also add (4) A4=mT=o.5T, say. We now find that if
/X G= A T= I, then A £= o. 17. Note, however, that if ~ G---- I and A T=o, then
z3 T= x.67 in the open economy model. These considerations suggest that in the
case of Ireland, increases in current government expenditure financed by taxation
could have had only relatively marginal impacts on economic expansion, whereas
(mainly capital) expenditure financed by borrowing was, even in the short run,
substantially more expansionary.
2QFor an interesting critique of budgetary policy in the i95os
, 
and comparison
of such policies with those of the ’sixties, the reader is urged to consult K. Kennedy
and B. Dowling, Post-War Economia Growth in Ireland, The Role of Exports and
ltome Danand, Gill and Macmillan, forthcoming (1975). See also D. Norton,
op. cit., x974.
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the previous year’s actions:7 The effect of discretionary budget
measures on the balance of payments on current account was
estimated in like manner. This made it possible to calculate the
trade-off between the two key-target variables. It was found
that this trade-off was about minus one: a one million pound
increase in real GNP brought about by discretionary budget
measures was attained, in the short-run, "at a cost" of a one
million pound increase in the balance of payments deficit
expressed in current market prices. The data used in estimating
these effects were not those reported in the official National
Accounts publication. Rather, those statistics had to be
transformed appropriately to put them on an intelligible
calendar year basis.~s
So much for the short-run effects of fiscal policy. Less of a
concrete nature can be said regarding the other most common
instrument of short-run control, namely, monetary policy. A
particular variable is a policy instrument if, and only if, it is
subject to direct control by policymakers. By this definition, the
Central Bank, until the early ’seventies, was very poorly equipped
with statutory policy instruments by which it could control
credit availability. The Bank did not have the power to
impose binding minimum reserve ratios on the commercial
banks. Under Section 5° of the Central Bank Act, I942
,
compulsory non-interest-bearing deposits at the Central Bank
could be required of any licensed banker if the assets held by
him within the State fell below a specified proportion in
relation to his liabilities within the State. The aim of that
provision was to ensure that the banks would expand credit in
raThe model employed to generate these estimates, which was constructed under
the supervision of Bent Hansen, is an elaboration, to suit the Irish context, of that
used by Hansen to estimate the short-run effects of fiscal policy in seven other
countries. See B. Hansen assisted by W. Snyder, Fiscal Policy in Seven Countries
i955/1965, OECD, Paris, x968. We made no attempt to distinguish the short-run
effects of demand management (stabilisation) policy from the short-run effects of
expansion of government expenditure as part of overall development policy.
~SThe transformation of data was made because the official National Accounts
presentation is objectionable in principle. It is not known how important a factor
this transformation was in arriving at the estimates reported above. In so far as the
cumulative short-run effects of fiscal policy are concerned, it appears likely that it
was of minor importance.
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the State when the Central Bank deemed desirable. It implied,
however, that in the absence of further legislation, any
"reserve" ratio in the form of an external assets ratio formally
set by the Bank would have to be a maximum rather than a
minimum figure. The Bank could, in principle, have refused to
recognise Exchequer Bills held by the banks as eligible paper
for non-penal rediscounting. However, its first admission that it
had rediscounted at a penal rate appears to have been in a
lecture~9 given by the Governor of the Bank to the Economics
Society at University College, Dublin, as late as February i97o.
Finally, the Bank did have statutory power to restrain domestic
lending by sales of Government securities on the open market.
But from the standpoint of monetary control, that power was
virtually irrelevant until very recently, simply because of the
small size of the Irish money market, and because the Bank
itself had only a very small portfolio of securities which it could
sell on the open market.
The money supply in the ’sixties tended to react, passively,
to real phenomena, rather than to policy decisions at the
Central Bank. Assertions have, nevertheless, been made to the
contrary. ThusJ. Oslizlok, Economist at the Bank in November
1967, wrote that "credit creation is the policy variable, that is
the variable which--in the light of external reserves criteria
and broader economic policy decisions--constitutes the basis of
monetary policy".3° Credit creation in the ’sixties was not,
even in the short-run, a variable subject to much control, either
directly or indirectly, by the Central Bank, largely because (a)
The Bank had no legal power to impose minimum reserve, or
liquidity, requirements on the commercial banks. (b) The
commercial banks did not feel that they ought decline govern-
ment "requests" for additional credit. (c) The commercial
banks, in the short-run, found difficulty in controlling the
29See Central Bank of Ireland, Quarterly Bulletin, Spring 197o
, 
p. 78. Refer also
to David O’Mahony, The Irish Economy, Second Edition, Cork University Press,
I967, P. 93.
80j. Oslizlok, "Towards a Monetary Analysis of Aggregate Demand", Central
Bank of Ireland, Quarterly Bulletin, November i967, p. 59. See also p. 6x.
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amount of credit extended by themselves to the private sector.
That was because of the kind of overdraft facilities in operation
in Ireland until recently. Typically, at any one time, there were
large unutilised overdraft facilities outstanding. An attempt by
a commercial bank to contract credit, in such circumstances,
could be substantially offset by greater use of existing overdraft
facilities.31
It has often been suggested that the openness of the Irish
economy would have rendered futile attempts by the Central
Bank to pursue discretionary monetary policies. Suppose, for
example, on some occasion in the ’sixties, that the Central
Bank had somehow succeeded in imposing an X per cent net
external assets ratio, or Central Bank ratio, or liquidity ratio,
with the objective of making credit conditions tight in the
Republic. Other things being equal, there would then have
been a tendency for interest rates to rise in the short-run. In the
absence of further measures, this in turn would have attracted
capital flows into the country, thereby offsetting the original
policy measure. Such consequences could, however, have been
avoided, or at least would have been delayed significantly, if the
Central Bank reacted by, say, raising the relevant ratio, and/or
imposed ceilings on the interest payable on new foreign
deposits, and/or required a high discriminatory ratio applying
to foreign deposits and/or increased compulsory non-interest-
bearing deposits by the banks at the Central Bank. All of this
assumes, of course, that the Central Bank would have had the
statutory power to implement such policies.
We do not accept the view that monetary policy is un-
important, or is necessarily ineffective, in small open economies
like Ireland. We cannot accept the statements, made recently
in a study on money and economic activity in Ireland,3~" that
the Canadian economist Mundell "has established that in a
relatively small economy with large trading partners, and fixed
~lCentral Bank of Ireland, Report, I968/69, p. 42, and Quarierly Bulletin, Spring
x97o, p. 74.
~D. Rodney Thom, "Money, Interest and Economic Activity in Ireland",
The Economic and Social Review, January 1974, pp. 2ol, 2o2, and footnote on p. ~o2.
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exchange rates, changes in the domestic money stock are
independent of open market operations carried out by the
Central Bank . . . This implies that monetary policy (defined
as open market operations) has no effect upon domestic
income". Modern theoretical work (including that of Mundell)
suggests that although monetary policy in the form of open
market operations (when feasible) in small open economies
with fixed exchange rates may have no lasting33 impact on the
level of real income, it can have significant effects on that
variable in the short-run.3~ It may, accordingly, play an
important role in stabilisation policy. Now we are not suggesting
that large-scale open market operations for purposes of macro-
economic stabilisation would have been feasible in the rudi-
mentary money and capital markets of Ireland in the I96os.
Rather, extraordinary circumstances excepted, our reasoning
is as follows: (i) Open market purchases (sales) and reductions
(increases) in required minimum reserve ratios have similar
short-run macro-economic effects. (ii) If it were true that open
market operations, when feasible in small open economies with
fixed exchange rates, have no short-run effect on domestic
income, then changes in minimum reserve requirements
would have no short-run effect on domestic income. (iii) Since
open market operations, when fcasible in small open economies
with fixed exchange rates, can affect domestic income in the
short-run, so too can changes in minimum reserve requirements.
Besides, as remarked in the previous paragraph, open market
operations, or a once-and-for-all change in minimum reserve
requirements, are not the only effective media of short-run
monetary policy.
As already indicated, the greater the number of relevant
3aBy lasting impact is meant a permanent change in real income after tile
economy has adjusted fully to the change in the domestic assets of the banking
system.
34R. Mundell, "Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and
Flexible Exchange Rates"~ Canadian ffournal of Eeonomigs anti Political Science,
November x963, and A. Swoboda, "Monetary Policy under Fixed Exchange
Rates: Effectiveness, the Speed of Adjustment and Proper Use", Eaonomiea,
May I973.
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policy instruments that are available, the larger the number of
targets that can be attained. It seems clear, in this context,
that in so far as monetary matters were concerned, short-run
economic policy in Ireland was, until recently, inefficiently
pursued. That was largely because the Central Bank had little
statutory power to employ effective macro-economic policy
instruments. Thus, some important policy variables were
constrained to a value of zero, and so could not be employed
in the pursuit of economic objectives.
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4. Monetary and Gap Analysis in the Formulation of
National Plans: The Need for Financial Programming
C ONSISTENCY and feasibility are important features of
economic planning. They relate, inter alia, to (i) the
balancing of supplies (production and imports) and demands
(including exports); (ii) the matching of production targets
with capital stock capacities; (iii) the equating of supplies and
demands for different kinds of labour; (iv) the matching of the
balance of payments on current account with projected capital
inflows plus projected changes in foreign exchange reserves;
(v) the formulation of policies equating ex ante savings and
investment at the levels implicit by (i) to (iv), and (vi) co-
ordination of monetary and fiscal policies in the attainment of
the chosen objectives.
We observed--in Section 2 of this paper--that the documents
pertaining to the three Irish programmes paid scant attention
to the monetary and fiscal implications of attaining the targets
set or of realising the projections. We elaborate on that obser-
vation now, by focusing on (v) and (vi) above.
Analysis of the monetary and fiscal implications of material-
balance projections, along with the design of complementary
monetary and fiscal policies over the planning period, is what
we mean by financial programming. Turn first to the role of fiscal
policy in the ex ante equalisation of savings and investment.
(We shall refer to this as gap analysis.)
Development planning in Ireland has proceeded in terms of
constant prices. Ex ante savings and investment must be
matched if an inflationary or a deflationary gap is to be
avoided. This matching is largely the responsibility of fiscal
policy.
Assume, in the problem of plan formulation, that the
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physical balances have been projected so that for each year of
the plan, total planned demand for each commodity, at
constant factor-cost prices, equals total planned supply (from
domestic production and imports). The fiscal implications and
alternatives of these projections are then best seen by con-
structing a rough model of the economy in which variables
projected in the physical balance exercise are assumed known,
while fiscal variables would be among the unknowns. In order
for a meaningful solution to exist for such a model, it would
need to contain at least as many unknowns as equations. If
there are a large number of fiscal instruments available, then
analysis of the fiscal implications of the material balance
projections will typically lead policymakers to realise that
several combinations of tax rates, subsidies, and transfer
payments are possible from the standpoint of balancing ex ante
savings and investment in each year of the plan. If fiscal
instruments, equal in number to the degrees of freedom in the
model, can be set by government policy in each year under
consideration, then the fiscal implications of the plan, and the
implied profile of the economy at constant market prices, are
completely determined.
We have just focused on the role of fiscal policy in ensuring
that the plan projections, at market prices, are consistent. It
was implicitly assumed, however, that the general economic
policy of the government--and not just fiscal policy--would be
directed toward attaining the targets. Monetary policy will be
of some importance in this context. Analysis of the monetary
implications of the plan is what we mean by the monetary
equilibrium aspect of financial programming.
Given that the physical balance projections have been made,
and given that consistent fiscal policies have been decided
upon, the monetary analysis involves setting up some rough
model providing a monetary mirror of the physical balance
projections and the chosen fiscal policies. For the monetary
mirror to be meaningful, the model of the monetary sector
would have to contain at least as many unknowns as equations,
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and some of these unknowns would, ideally, be policy instru-
ments. Elsewhere35 we have attempted to outline a financial
programming model to highlight the fiscal and monetary
implications of material-balance projections. Although we were
unhappy with this exercise, the overwhelming practical
conclusion was that, had the Irish planners tried to conduct the
same kind of analysis, in say, the early ’sixties, they would have
been made aware of the need for the imposition of flexible
reserve, or liquidity ratios, on the commercial banks, as well as
the need for greater co-ordination in monetary and fiscal policy.
It has probably been noticed that in our discussion of
financial programming, the monetary analysis was made after
consistent fiscal policies over the planning period were as-
sumed to have been selected. In practice, both aspects should
be analysed simultaneously. A further objection to the ap-
proach outlined, which was based on initial projections at
constant factor-cost prices, is that the factor-cost price level
may rise throughout the planning period, due in part to
uncontrollable phenomena. It will be shown later, when we
come to discuss rolling plans, that this objection is not serious.
We turn now to the Irish programmes for evidence of gap
and monetary equilibrium analyses. The First Programme did
not provide any detailed monetary and fiscal analysis. The two
pages of Part VI of that document did, however, contain a
discussion entitled "Capital Cost and Available Resources".
A review of that section indicates that the ex ante balancing of
savings and investment was not adequately considered. That
can be seen by quoting the main body of Part VI of the
programme document almost in its entirety:~
Capital Cost and Available Resources
Cost of Proposals
x33. An estimate of the amount required to finance the pro-
gramme of economic development is made in Appendix I .... The
B6Chapter VII in D. Norton, The Macro Stage in Irish Planning, 1958/1972;
A Study in the Quantitative Theory of Economic Policy, Ph.D. Dissertation, University
of California at Berkeley, August z 973.
38First Prograrnrr~, pp. 47, 48"
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capital cost is estimated at £53 million in the five-year period from
1959/6o (the first full year) to 1963/64.
134. This cost is additional to that which will be required to
finance the public capital programme on the basis of present policies.
¯.. The total capital cost for the period is estimated at £220 million.
Resources
135. It is necessary to relate these estimates to the financial
resources likely to be available. These resources are current savings,
external assets and external borrowing (including foreign investment
in Ireland).
Current Savings
136. It is assumed that in the years immediately ahead savings
will, on average, be sufficient to maintain capital formation at the
1957 level ....
External Assets
137. These consist of the external investments held by the private
sector and the external reserves held by the monetary authorities.
External investments are not available to finance balance of
payments deficits unless they are sold by their owners or used
directly to purchase imports. In considering the extent to which
external reserves can be drawn upon to finance any gap between
investment needs and available resources, the following factors,
amongst others, have to be borne in mind:
(i)the primary purpose of these reserves is to underpin the
exchange value of the currency ....
(ii) our economy is subject to acute fluctuations in external
trade, the impact of which falls primarily on the liquid
external reserves of the commercial banks, affecting their
ability to extend domestic credit;
(iii) the external reserves of the commercial banks have been
greatly reduced since the war and now afford little margin
over minimum liquidity requirements ....
If there should be any scarcity of home capital for productive
development, it would be in accordance with . . . policy that future
issues of legal tender notes should not involve an addition to the
external reserves of the Central Bank.
External Borrowing
I38. Where available resources are inadequate to finance
productive projects, they will be supplemented by borrowing
from the specialised international lending institutions .... Moreover,
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direct capital participation by externs in new industrial projects
will be encouraged ....
The discussion of "costs" refers to the cost of the public
capital programme. On the other hand, the discussion under
the heading "resources" expresses little more than the view
that ex ante savings should somehow equal total (public and
private) ex ante investment. As, however, no attempt appears to
have been made to forecast ex ante private investment (whether
autonomous or induced by income changes), it is reasonable to
conclude that no adequate gap analysis of ex ante savings and
investment, with corresponding fiscal policy implications, was
conducted.
Economic Development,~7 the background document for the
First Programme, contained considerable discussion of the
monetary aspects of financing investment. In this respect, it
was probably superior to any subsequent public policy docu-
ment. It was not, however, without its oversights. Thus, it
proposed that domestic assets might be accepted as backing
for future issues of Legal Tender Notes and that, considerations of
foreign borrowing aside, "this proposal would obviate the im-
mobilisation within the Legal Tender Note Fund of external
reserves at present held by the commercial banks which would
otherwise have to be surrendered to the Central Bank to pay
for new Legal Tender Notes. Those reserves would be avail-
able to finance external deficits incurred to step up domestic
capital formation",z8 The inference that such reserves would
have been available to finance current account external deficits
was not correct, for the following reason: It was stated that the
net external assets of the Associated banks, at about 3° per cent
of their domestic deposit liabilities, were "at a minimum safe
level". Furthermore, it was not intended to run down the
external reserves of the Central Bank or of Departmental
Funds. Now it could be expected, with the proposed economic
development, that the domestic deposit liabilities of the banks
sTEconomic Development, Pr. 4803, Stationery Office, Dublin, I958.
aSlbid., PP. 39, 4°.
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would increase,; they would, therefore, have had to increase the
absolute level of their net external assets in order to approximate
the specified 3° per cent net external assets ratio. This would,
in fact, have required current account international pa~,ments
surpluses.
The Second Programme recognised, in general terms, the
importance of balancing ex ante savings and investment; the
Government would attempt to maintain "adequate", not
"excessive", aggregate demand.39 Little of a specific nature was
said, however, of how a small or zero gap was to be brought
about, and monetary policy received virtually no attention.
Chapter 14 of the Second Programme, Part H was entitled
"Financing of Investment". Nevertheless, little discussion of
the specific fiscal policies which would be employed to finance
investment--in particular to balance ex ante savings and in-
vestment--was provided. The three-page Chapter I5, entitled
"General Financial Policy", had nothing to say of financial
policy, other than in the context of such vague phrases as
"remedial action", "appropriate action", "corrective measures"
and the like. The net conclusion which emerges is that the
Second Programme was too much concerned with projections,
too little concerned with economic planning.
The methodology of the Third Programme was broadly in line
with that of the Second. Again, monetary and fiscal considera-
tions were given virtually no significance in its methodology.
Like its predecessor, it failed to recognise that the ultimate sets
of unknowns in any policy problem are not the projections or
the targets, but rather the instruments. It appears to us only a
slight over-statement to say that we in Ireland, in designing
our plans, have tended to view economic policy with its head
upside down: we have tended to focus on targets and projections
as the ultimate unknowns, as though in many cases the policy
instruments could be taken for granted.
SgThese were the key words used to describe financial policy in the Second
Programme, Part I, p. 6~. Monetary policy and the monetary implications of the
programme were discussed nowhere in that document.
3°
Ii
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
i
I
I
I
A few more remarks may be appropriate concerning financial
programming, or, rather, its relative absence in Ireland.4°
From 1965 onwards, the Central Bank placed great stress on
the importance of controlling credit availability. As the Bank
was ill-equipped with statutory policy instruments, it had to
rely, until the Autumn of I97241, on moral suasion in the form
of credit advice to the banking system. Iu various issues of its
Report and Qdtarterly Bulletin, however, it complained that such
advice had not been adhered to. Had the monetary implications
of the Irish programmes been seriously analysed (and in
consequence the complementary policy alternatives been
highlighted), the need for additional monetary policy instru-
ments and appropriate legislation would almost certainly have
been seen, at an early stage. Instead, monetary policy in
Ireland proceeded very much on an ad hoc basis, with legis-
lation on monetary matters being enacted years after the need
for it had arisen. It seems highly probable, had monetary
equilibrium exercises been conducted, that the need for flexible
reserve ratios for the banking system, enforceable through
legislation increasing the powers of the Central Bank, would
have been recognised at an early stage. These considerations
suggest that the failure to seriously analyse the monetary
implications of the three programmes was a major flaw in our
planning procedure. This view is reinforced by some further
considerations which concern debt management and co-
ordination of monetary and fiscal policy.
Debt management is a bridge between pure monetary and
pure fiscal policy. Failures in financial programming also
l°Inadequate attention to the monetary equilibrium aspects of financial pro-
gramming is probably one factor in explaining why, especially in the first half of
the period under review, we tended to regard the balance of payments on current
account as the criterion of"equilibrium" in the balance of international payments.
~XWhat appear to be the first published official references to the existence of
liquidity ratios can be found in the Central Bank’s Quarterly Bulletin, Spring x973.
It seems, however, that such ratios were introduced in the Autumn of 197~. See
"Banking in the Republic of Ireland", Midland Bank Review, November x973,
pp. 12-i8. I am indebted to Mice~d O Suilleabh~dn of University College, Cork
for indicating this reference to me.
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brought poteritial problems in this area. O’Donoghue,42
writing in I968, noted that little attempt had apparently been
made to create a graduated structure in the maturity of the
debt. The resulting bunching meant that relatively large
amounts could fall due for repayment and refunding at any
one time. Tait,4s writing in I97I, was concerned with the
fact that the State would have to refund one-third of the
National Debt within the five years from fiscal i969/7o. Such
bunching could interfere with the operation of short-run
monetary policies. On one hand, there might be problems of
absorption by the market without stimulating large-scale
international capital movements and consistent with prices for
debt instruments which did not fluctuate very considerably,
as the State sought to redeem and raise very substantial blocks
of debt within short periods of time while, in other short
periods, doing so only to a relatively minor degree. Also, there
would be temptations not to implement restrictive monetary
policies at times warranted by economic conditions if the
authorities knew that within a short period they would be
coming on the market seeking to re-borrow the bulk of the
maturing debt.
On 3z March, I974--the latest date for which figures are
available--the total o~cial National Debt44 was over £z,622
million. Of this, about ~I,454 million was internal, while over
~I67 million was borrowed externally.~ As at 31 March x974,
’lSM. O’Donoghue, "Monetary Policy", Chapter 4 in J. Bristow and A. Talt
(¢ds.), Economic Policy in Ireland, Institute of Public Administration, Dublin, 1968.
**A. Tait, "Some Issues of Irish Debt Policy", Chapter II in A. Tait and
J. Bristow (eds.), Ireland; Some Problems of a Developing Economy, Gill & Macmillan,
Dublin, Barnes & Noble, New York, 197~.
~*The off’~ial National Debt is as defined in Accounts No. XXV and XXVI of
the Finance Accounls, x973]74. References to "the National Debt" in Ireland are
normally confined to those categories of State liabilities.
*SThcsc were the amounts duc externally in terms of the international exchange
rates prevailing at the times the loanr were negotiated. Due to exchange rate changes
since then, the actual official external debt was higher than the figure (~167
million) reported in the Finance Accounts. According to information kindly pro-
vidcd by the Dcpartrncnt of Finance, the official external debt on 3z March, x974,
using the exchange rates prcvaillng on 29 March, x974, was ~2oo million. By
3x December, x974, the official external debt, in terms of the exchange rates
prevailing late in December x974, was about ~’36o million. Scc Clcntral Bank of
Ireland, Quarterly Bullain, Winter 1974, Statistical Appendix, Table 5.
almost one half of the official internal debt will mature in the
five years to 31 March, 1979; we have already remarked on the
difficulties which this bunching may entail. It is understood
that attempts have been made in recent years to effect a
graduated structure in the official National Debt. As, however,
bunching can be eliminated only in the longer-run, the ’present
problem in this respect possibly reflects failures in consciously
attempting to avoid such bunching in the not so recent past.
What one might call the unoaficial National Debt is of greater
concern to us. In Ireland these State liabilities are normally
forgotten about in discussions of "the National Debt". The
classification "unofficial" reflects the fact that the official Debt
Understates public liabilities. When, for example, a public
enterprise such as Aer Lingus or the ESB negotiates a loan
abroad, the resulting liabilities are not reckoned as part of the
official National Debt. The State does, however, guarantee
such loans. At 31 March 1974 the Government had guaranteed
loans of which the amount outstanding was over ~369 million.
Over £13o million of this was in the form of external obliga-
tions-and such external indebtedness has risen very rapidly
since then. The data in the Finance Accounts do not enable us to
infer the overall maturity structure of these Government-
guaranteed loans, and, so far as we have been able to ascertain,
as of April 1974, nobody in the public service had analysed this
matter. This observation was first raised by the present author
in May 1974 when the main body of this paper was delivered
as a public lecture. It is, however, consoling to note that the
Central Bank has, since the Autumn of 1974, published statistics
on the term structure of the external debt of State-sponsored
bodies. However, the dangers are clear: unless we have
conscious co-ordination to create a graduated structure in the
total external public debt--and that includes the rapidly rising
external debt of public enterprises--we are in danger of
reaching a situation in which very substantial sums unex-
pectedly fall due for repayment abroad in a given year. The
resulting strain on the basic international payments balance
33
could then lead to the application of demand deflationary
policies to the domestic economy. In order to avoid such
consequences, we require greater co-ordination between the
Department of Finance, the public enterprises, and the
Central Bank.
As in longer-run matters (in plan design and in the profile of
the total National Debt) there has been serious lack of co-
ordination in short-run monetary and fiscal policy. As prev-
iously remarked, the credit advice extended by the Central
Bank to the Associated banks since the mid-’sixties had only
very limited success, partly because of government requests for
loans which the banks did not feel they ought to decline. This
was the very antithesis of co-ordination in monetary arid
fiscal policy. In circumstances like this, the Central Bank could,
and did, justly complain. In November 1967, Oslizlok, Econ-
omist at the Bank, wrote as follows :4e
A Central Bank does not exercise any discretion (and
’credit policy’ is simply a misnomer) if the Central Bank
waits for all the monetary demands by the public author-
ities, semi-state bodies and by various sections of the
community at large to be freely formulated and then
translates these demands into some kind of a directive,
advice or ratio. The very purpose of discretionary action
by the monetary authority is to influence spending
decisions before they are formulated and not merely to
accommodate itself to them.
The first rigorous theoretical analysis of the importance of
co-ordination of short-run monetary and fiscal policies appears
to have been presented by Bent Hansen twenty years ago.47
But up to the ’seventies the moral does not seem to have been
grasped in the formulation of Irish economic policy. We should
point out, in this context, that it was indeed recognised in 1958
4eCentral Bank of Ireland, Quarterly Bulletin, November I967, p. 57, footnote
*~Bent Hansen, The Economic Theory of Fiscal Policy (Translation from the z955
Swedish edition), Allen and Unwin, I958, Chapter I. See also J. E. Meade,
The Balance of Payments, Mathematical Supplement, Oxford University Press, x95x.
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in Economic Development (p. 29) that "there should be the closest
liaison between the Central Bank and the Minister for Finance
so that by constant consultation and collaboration effect may
be given to a financial policy favouring development to the
utmost but avoiding any significant deficit in the balance of
payments". The need for co-ordination was, however, over-
looked in the three programmes. Although it did complain, it
seems to us that the Central Bank, in the ’sixties at least, was
expected to act as a rubber stamp for Government policies.
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5. The Case for Rolling Plans
Tri~. final question we wish to consider is whether or not we
should have another national plan, and if so, what form
such programming should take. It may be felt that there is no
need for national planning in ireland. If that were the case,
completely decentralised decision-making without any co-
ordination would presumably yield the best attainable social
and economic results both over time and at any point in time.
The history of the economy as well as several of the considera-
tions already raised in this paper convincingly suggest that
decentralised myopic decision-making would not yield such
results. The need for some kind of national planning beyond the
fiscal year is obvious when we bear in mind that policy actions
today have consequences in future years, while the attainment
of objectives in future years requires public policy actions in
the current year. In April 1972 the Government announced
that the preparation of a Fourth Programme--which we
have not yet seen--had been approved. According to the 1972
Budget Statement, this was to cover the three-year period 1973
to 1975. More recently, in his 1974 Budget Statement, the
Minister for Finance announced that :48
The preparation of an econonfic and social programme
covering the four-year period ahead has been under active
consideration for some time. This task could not be
approached on the basis of blueprints of previous prog-
rammes . . . Uncertainty is the catchword of the present
world-wide economic scene... These and other uncertain-
ties are expected to have a profound and pervasive effect
on the economy, and underline the necessity for a funda-
**Budget, x974, Stationery Office, Dublin, p. t3.
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mental renew of planning methods. As it is too soon yet to
assess their likely full impact in the coming years, the
Government have decided that it would not be possible to
publish a meaningful programme pending a reassessment
of medium-term planning in the light of the current
unsettled world .economic situation. Meanwhile, the
Government will continue with its reappraisal of the
strategies on which economic and social planning should
be based.
The Minister reiterated these views in his 1975 Budget
Statement, in the course of which he remarked that :40
Of all the tasks which could engage my attention, the
least realistic would be the publication of a medium or
long-term economic plan based on irrelevancies in the
past, hunches as to the present and clairvoyance as to the
future.
We agree that medium-term plans (just like those short-run
plans which we call budgets) should not be based on "irrelevan-
cies" and "clairvoyance". What is upsetting is that our govern-
ments have spent over three years thinking about how to
formulate medium-term policies in an environment of un-
certainty. They have not yet come to a conclusion. Two
questions are of particular relevance: what should the time
horizon of the practical planner be, and how should he take
account of uncertainty? Economic analysis has shed some
light on these problems.
First, we side-step uncertainty and investigate the question of
optimal time horizon. Much of the theoretical literature on
optimal economic growth suggests that the rational planner
should have an infinite time horizon. That is because otherwise
the terminal conditions of the plan may be arbitrary. In a
rolling plan, by contrast, the plan, of finite time horizon, is
revised at the end of each year and an additional year is
**D~il l~ireann, Parliamentary Debates, Off’wial Report, Vol. 277, No. 2, x5 January,
x975, p. 220.
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added to the list. The effect of such revision is always to main-
tain a planning horizon of approximately fixed length. Steve
Goldman, an American economist, has investigated the
dynamic properties of such plans in a deterministic environ-
ment.5° He focused attention upon the effects of continual
revision and compared those with the effects of plans of
infinite duration.
We do not describe Goldman’s contributions in detail
because they are quite technical. What he did51 is roughly as
follows: he constructed an aggregate "growth model of the neo-
classical type in which the objective of the planner is to max-
imise the sum of utility, U, over time. The planner’s utility,
in turn, is a strictly increasing function of per capita consump-
tion, c. It is also assumed that the planner discounts the future
at the exponential rate 3, so the Strotz problem of inconsist-
ency 52 does not arise. Thus, it is assumed that the objective
of the planner is to maximise
fT U[c(t)] e-~t dr.
subject to certain laws of motion in the economy, and subject
to a constraint that capital per man must not be diminished.
O is the base time and T the terminal time of the plan. Further-
more, Goldman assumed that the planner always maintains a
horizon of T years, so that when an instant of time elapses, the
planner simply extends the terminal date by that instant.
Goldman’s fundamental theorem is as follows:
Theorem: Suppose that, at each moment, growth is planned so
6°S. M. Goldman, "Optimal Growth and Continual Planning Revision",
Review of Economic Studies, April 1968, and "Sequential Planning and Continual
Planning Revision", 3ournal of Political Economy, July/August, i969. Because
Goldman’s models are deterministic (no uncertainty is present) they do not take
account of the fact that with planning revision, the planner can take advantage of
the aectimula~on oflnt’ormafion over time.
5xS. M. Goldman, x968.
5~R. H. Strotz, "Myopia and Ineousistency in Dynamic Utility Maximisation"3
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 23, (x955156), pp. I65-x8o.
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as to maximise welfare over the next T years and to leave a
remaining capital-labour ratio at least as large as at the
inception of the plan. Suppose further that the plan is con-
tinuously revised and that the constraint on the terminal
capital-labour ratio is altered to reflect the endowment at the
moment of revision. The resulting programme of growth is ....
the same as would have occurred if the initial planning period
had been for an infinite length of time (with no revision).
The relevance of this result is as follows. A standard objection
to optimal growth models with finite time horizon is that the
terminal conditions are arbitrary. The real-world planner, on
the other hand, would say that he cannot in practice come. up
with a plan document embracing infinity. What Goldman has
shown is that--at least in the particular model he analyses--
by rolling plans we can side-step the practical problems of
planning over an infinite horizon, while, at the same time, we
can plan as/fwe were planning over infinity. Thus, even if the
objective of the planner is to maximise some function of the
welfare of all future generations, he may be able to do so by
adopting rolling plans, continuously maximising over a finite
time horizon, subject to constraints on the capital-labour ratio.
These considerations lead, quite naturally, to the question:
Granted that the decision-maker cannot, or need not, plan for
infinity, precisely how long should his time horizon be?
The open dynamic input-output model of Leontief can cast
some light on the appropriate time horizon of the practical
planner. The particular study by Leontief to which we refer~
employed US data. It is a little technical, and is described in
some detail in Appendix II. It expresses the gross outputs of
the various sectors of the economy in any given year as a
function of the levels of final demand (excluding investment
demand, which is endogenously determined) for those sectors
in future years. The dependence of the gross outputs of a given
year on all future final demand vectors over the planning period
*3Wassily Leontief, "The Dynamic Inverse", Chapter I in A. P. Carter and
A. Brody, (ecls.), Contributions to Input Output Analysis, North-Holland, t97o.
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is related, intdr alia, to the following considerations: (i) The
model is, by implication, constrained to avoid, in every year,
excess capacity in the capital stock; alternatively, we can
interpret it as implying art approximately constant percentage
of slack in the capital stock in each year. (ii) Other things being
equal, increased capital is necessary in order to increase gross
output (which includes output of capital goods). (iii) Other
things being equal, an increase in gross output is necessary to
facilitate an increase in final demand. (iv) There is a lag in the
installation of capital equipment. Thus, to increase output over
time we need to increase the capital stock over time, and the
increments in the capital stock must precede the increments in
output. Furthermore, to make capital goods we need other
capital goods, wlfich in turn require other capital goods, and
so on backwards in a virtual never-ending circuit of inter-
dependence. Hence, it is fundamentally the lags in the instal-
lation of capital equipment which account for the dependence
of the gross outputs in a given year on the level of final demand
in future years.
Given that intertemporal interdependence of the kind just
outlined exists, it is important to know how rapidly it con-
verges toward zero. If, for example, we find that the coefficients
relating final demands in time periods more than, say, six
years from the beginning of the current year (the base year), to
the gross output vector of the current year, are very close to
zero, then we can argue that the basic plan of the practical
planner should have a time horizon of no more than six years.
That would be because the attainment of final demand targets
for years more than six years into the future would, in effect,
be irrelevant to decisions made in the base year.
Suppose we found that interdependencies of the form dis-
cussed were significant over periods of six years but that for
years beyond the sixth year, they could in effect be treated as
zero in the sense that the attainment of final demand targets in
the seventh and later years had little or no implication for the
level or composition of gross outputs in the first year. We
4°
would then reach the important conclusion that the core or
basic plan of the practical planner should have a time horizon
of six years. But there is another vital inference which we would
draw: At the beginning of the second year, when the first
(previous base) year had become history, the rational planner
would (unless he had good reasons to act as though the world
were going to end at the termination of the sixth year) still
maintain a six-year time horizonfrora the second year. That would
be because, by assumption, the attainment of final demand
targets in year seven would have implications for the level and
composition of gross output in year two, which would become
the new base year of another six-year plan. Extending this
reasoning, the rational policy-maker would adopt rolling plans
with a six-year time horizon, thereby always maintaining
approximately the appropriate time horizon.
In the case of most of the industries in Leonfief’s study
(which employed US data) changes in the final demand vector
in any year t had relatively minor implications for the outputs
of the various sectors in years before t-4. If the structure of the
Irish economy were identical to that of the USA we would
conclude, in the light of Leontief’s findings, that the basic time
horizon in Irish planning should be 5 or 6 years. However, the
results in the US study cannot be applied directly to Ireland:
in the Irish economy, the relatively small size of the capital-
goods sectors and the importance of imports of capital-goods
imply that the appropriate basic planning period might be
shorter than that indicated by the US data. These and other
considerations suggest that the basic planning horizon in the
Irish context should be about 4 years, though clearly we would
require a dynamic input-output model of the Irish economy
before precision could be attached to that figure. In any case,
it is obvious that, in order always to approximate the optimal
basic time horizon, planning should be of the rolling form. Thus
we conclude that in Ireland the basic plan of the practical
planner should have a time horizon of about 4 years and that it
should be of the rolling form; in order always to approximate
4!
the optimal time horizon, a new year should be added to the
horizon every time the previous base year elapses. Such rolling
medium-term plans would, however, have to be integrated into
some perspective planning framework. These perspective plans
would take account of inter-temporal interactions significant
over time periods of more than four years’ duration. Standard
examples of such lags can be found in manpower programming,
project appraisal, and in debt management and external
borrowing.
The case for rolling plans is even more convincing when we
introduce uncertainty and recognise that an economy is in
fact a stochastic system. A stochastic system (i.e. a dynamic
system involving random variables) which evolves according
to a rule which also involves variables or parameters under
external control is called a stochastic control system. If these
variables or parameters are determined so that the system
behaves as well as possible by some specified criterion, one has
achieved optimal control of the stochastic system. So far, we
have hardly explicitly recognised that an economy is such a
system, but doing so strengthens our argument for rolling plans.
Under varying assumptions regarding the objectives of the
controller, and the information available to him, different
optimal stochastic control policies result. These fall into three
broad categories: optimal pure open-loop control, optimal
closed-loop feedback control, and a control scheme inter-
mediate between those two, open-loop optimal feedback
control. We recall from the early part of this paper than an
open-loop control system is one in which the sequence of
controls to be applied over time is decided in advance, as a
function of time. Thus, with an open-loop control scheme, the
decision-maker commits himself in advance to making various
specific decisions at specific points in time. In a closed-loop
(feedback) system, by contrast, the decision-maker works out a
strategyfor the future in which the decisions to be made at all
points in time over the relevant horizon are made dependent
on the state of the system at the time that each decision must
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finally be made. One could spend a long time cranking out
solutions for a long list of possible examples to indicate the
general superiority of closed-loop (feedback) control schemes;
these can be found in the literature.~a We have already dis-
cussed what closed-loop feedback control implies for economic
planning. Thus, consider a planner who, by manipulation of
policy instruments, seeks to maximise the expected perform-
ance of the economy over a period of X years. Taking certain
practical considerations into account,ss. we can say that his
best strategy is approximately as follows. At time zero, the
beginning of the planning period, he should devise that X year
plan for use of his instruments which seems best to him given
the information he has at time zero, and recognising that he
shall have opportunities to revise this plan at subsequent points
in time. At time one, the beginning of the second year, he
should devise that X-I year plan which seems best to him given
the information he has then (including the outcome of the
first decision) and recognising that further information will
unfold over time--and so on, until the beginning of year X.
By planning in this manner, the decision-maker anticipates
(forecasts) his expected future actions. That enables him to
make advance preparations. At the same time, however, he
may revise his anticipations (forecasts) to take account of the
accumulation of information over time. Note that there would
be no such accumulation of information over time if we lived
in a world of certainty.
The relatively simple scheme which we have just described
is in the spirit of that which we recommend for medium-term
planning in Ireland. We add only one further complication,
namely, rather than planning over a fixed calendar time
horizon (as in the above example), planners should sequentially
add a year to the calendar horizon every time the base year of
the plan elapses. Thus, we envisage medium-term plans, each
54See the works by S. Dreyfus cited in footnote xo above.
~SThe reasons why we qualify in this manner will be apparent to the reader
who consults the literature on applications (examples) of stochastic dynamic
programming.
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with a time horizon of about four years, sequentially rolling
forward in time.
It may be objected that our general preference for feedback
schemes in stochastic control stems from particular examples
in that literature~. That is not correct. An optimal feedback
scheme performs at least as well as an optimal open-loop scheme
on the averagOL This is because the set of all open-loop control
schemes is a subset of the set of all possible feedback schemes:
the same decision, for an open-loop system, must be associated
with all possible states of the system at a given time. Thus, even
when the assumptions of that particular feedback control
scheme best known to economists--the application of dynamic
(period by period) certainty equivalencOs break down, "we
will still generally prefer a stochastic control system with feed-
back to one without.
There are thus two vital conclusions which we reach from
these considerations of plan design. First, rolling plans, rather
than doing so, say, every four years, allow the planner always
to approximate the appropriate time horizon. Second, rolling
plans give ample opportunity for feedback control. On the
basis of both of these considerations, the conventional fixed-time-
horizon plan must be regarded as generally sub-optimal--and that
conclusion holds without having to know the precise form
of the planners’ objectives, or criterion function. We are
therefore led to the conclusion that both considerations of inter-
temporal dependence and the uncertainties underlying Irish planning,
due in large measure to the openness of the economy, present a very
strong case for the adoption of rolling plans with a time horizon of
about four years to the rolling terminal date. Such roiling plans
would have to be integrated into some perspective planning
framework. The case for rolling plans must be qualified,
however, with regard to the additional costs involved in
S6Dreyfus, op. ~qt.
~TDreyfus, op. cir., x968, gives some examples of stochastic problems in which,
by the criterion of minimising expected loss, it makes no difference whether
optimal open-loop or feedback control are used.
~sSee for example H. Theil, op. cir., x964.
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designing such" plans. It is believed that such costs would be
relatively small. Economic research is an ongoing matter in the
Department of Finance and at the ESRI, and the CSO has
the task of providing the most up-to-date statistical data each
year in connection with the formulation of budgetary policy.
One may also object that a drawback of such planning might
be the absence of sufficient discipline in ensuring that serious
effort is made to achieve the targets once they are initially set;
with rolling plans, there might be no day of reckoning when
targets are compared with performance. It should be noted,
in this context, that there is no reason why, with rolling plans,
targets cannot be compared with performance. We are willing
to concede, however, that frequent comparisons of targets and
performance may in practice be less likely to occur when plans
are revised from time to time (as with rolling plans) than would
be the case with conventional fixed terminal date planning.
The objection concerning the possible absence of sufficient
discipline in ensuring that serious effort is made to achieve the
targets once they are initially set is important, and underlines
the need for periodic comparisons of past targets and per-
formance, and assessment of that performance.
The case for rolling plans is intuitively appealing. Such a
procedure enables planners to react relatively quickly to new
information while maintaining a planning period sufficiently
long to highlight the intertemporal effects of their actions and
to enable structural or other major changes in the economy to
be realistically sought by policy. We know of only one public
decision-making body in Ireland which has explicitly recog-
nised the logic of rolling plans. Thus, in announcing a five-
year expansion programme, the Chairman of AnCIO stated
that "we look on this as a rolling plan which will have to be
constantly updated in the light Of experience and changing
circumstances".59 It is understood that rolling plans have
been proposed for The Netherlands, a highly open economy
ilAnCO News, February t974, p. I.
45
II
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
like Ireland iand hence also subject to great uncertainty
regarding the external environment), but one in which the
volume of serious policy-orientated economic research has
been substantially greater than in Ireland.
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General Conchlsions
W E have travelled a long way--from the static theory ofeconomic policy to stochastic control theory--in this
critique of economic planning and policy formation in Ireland.
Rather than summarise we will simply outline the more
important conclusions.
In general, the greater the number of relevant instruments
that are available to policymakers, the larger the number of
targets that can be attained, or, alternatively, if the objective
is to maximise some objective fimction, the higher the level of
welfare attainable. In this context, economic policy in Ireland
has been inefficiently pursued. That appears to be due, in large
measure, to the fact that little analysis was made of the mone-
tary and fiscal implications of our three programmes in the
past. Had such analyses been conducted, it is likely that the
need for effective monetary policy instruments, along with
appropriate legislation, would have been seen in advance--
rather than years after the need for them had arisen. The lack
of co-ordination between monetary and fiscal policy can also
be explained by failures in financial programming.
Regarding the form of planning rationally appropriate to
Ireland, both theoretical and immediately practical considera-
tions lead us to conclude that the degree of openness of the
economy, the uncertainty regarding the environment, and
considerations of optimal time horizon--all of these provide a
very strong case for the adoption of rolling plans, always
maintaining a time horizon of approximately four years to the
rolling terminal date.
We in Ireland have been analytically impatient--so im-
patient in fact, that in our hasty concern for "getting ahead"
we have focused on targets and projections of endogenous
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variables without due recognition of the fact that the instru-
ments rather than the targets are the ultimate unknowns in any
policy-orientated exercise. We have tended, in too many
respects, to regard policy instruments as data (or as variables
which could be "assumed away") rather than as variables
which decision-makers can control. A few economists have
recently called attention to the insufficient analysis which has
been given to the question whether the exchange rate vis-c2-vis
Sterling could profitably be manipulated as a policy instru-
ment6° Our argument is that such" lack of concern on that
specific question has been only one aspect of a more general
problem.
It is but a small over-statement to say that we have tended to
approach economic policy with its head upside down. This
has led to failures to recognise what objectives imply for use of
instruments and goes a long way in explaining why we have
been unable to decide on how we should rationally approach
policy questions over time, under conditions of uncertainty.
An oft-quoted passage in Keynes61 warns about the dangers of
falling into accepted modes of thought and the resulting
aversion to new ideas. We have not realised that this is what in
fact has happened to us. In our Anglo-Saxon insularity, we
have paid scant attention to the theory of economic policy
and its associated techniques. This important area of Political
6°See Moore McDowell, "Ireland: The Control of Inflation in a Small Open
Economy", Studies, forthcoming (Spring i975)
, 
and Louis Smith, "What We
Should Do About Sterling", Management, Journal of the Irish Management
Institute, January x975. We are not necessarily in agreement with all of the
arguments advanced by those authors.
6tRecall the (perhaps exaggerated) closing sentences of the General Theory
where Keynes suggests that "the ideas of economists and political philosophers,
both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is
commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men,
who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any academic influences, are
nsually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear
voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a
few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated
compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately,
but aftera certain interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy
there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five
or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and
even agitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest".
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Economy is, significantly, of non-British vintage, with the
seminal research emanating from The Netherlands, Scandinavia,
the USA and the USSR. What we need then, in our univer-
sities and elsewhere, is more, not less, Political Economy. But
this "new" Political Economy will have, within its domain,
not only the study of the sociological and political context in
which economic policy decisions are made, but also the more
rigorous modern theory of economic policy. The conclusions
inferred from that body of analysis, it may be argued, are
common sense. We have argued, by contrast, that in Ireland
they have been quite uncommon.
One final set of remarks in closing. We have touched on a
large number of sub-topics in this paper. If we are correct in
thinking that the various issues raised are of importance, then
we reach one final conclusion: our tendency to focus on
objectives rather than policies (instruments) may be partially
explained by the fact that we in Ireland have not been suffici-
ently interested in serious policy-orientated economic research.
If this is the case, then surely some re-thinking of our teaching
and research priorities is desirable6..
~*In a paper read at the Conference of Irish Economists, Ballymaseanlon, 28-3o
March, 1974, Louis Smith noted that "we (in Ireland) do not have the research
results to hand on which to base an informed policy (regarding the exchange rate
with Sterling). Even our teaching lays little stress on this topic".
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APPENDIX I
On Consistent Policy Problems
W E recall from elementary algebra that if we have a system of
non-contradictory and independent equations, with the
number of unknowns, /f, exceeding the number of equations, L,
then there exist an infinity of solutions to those equations. Under
such circumstances we can, however, solve (uniquely if the system
is linear) for L of the unknowns as functions of K--L of the un-
knowns. In particular, we can set/f--L of the unknowns at arbitrary
values (perhaps at zero levels) and find a finite number of solutions
(a unique solution if the system is linear) for the remaining L
unknowns.
If the equations in our system are non-contradictory and inde-
pendent, and if the number of equations equals the number of
unknowns, then a solution, which we can be sure is unique if the
system is linear, exists.
If, however, there are more independent equations than
unknowns, no solution exists.
Consider now the static deterministic policy problem with fixed
targets.
A consistent policy will then constitute a set of absolute targets
and a set of instruments which enables those targets to be attained.
Let ui, i----I . .., I denote instrument variables; let dk, k----I ...,
K denote data; let x,, n=I,..., aV denote target variables; and
let r~, ~ I,... S represent irrelevant variables. An economy can
then he represented by the structural equations:
(I) f,,(x1 .... , xN; rl, . .., rs; ul, . .., ux; d1 ...., dx)--__o
where m ---- I, . .., M, and W+S = M.
We thus have a model with M endogenous variables, and have
assumed that the government has assigned fixed target values to
W of them, namely, the x,. The system of M equations then contains
M--W+I unknowns, viz., the r~ and the uv If the equations (which
may be linear or non-linear) are independent and, in those cases where
there are no more equations than unknowns, if they are not contra-
dictory, we can have three possible cases:
(a) M--N+I>M, i.e., I>N, more unknowns than equations,
more instruments than targets. There are then an infinity
5°
II
I
I
I
I
of ways to satisfy the structural equations for given values
of the target variables. Many sets of instruments are
consistent with the specified targets.
(b) M--N+I = ~I, i.e., I = W, number of unknowns equals
number of equations, number of instruments equals
number of targets, so a solution, which we can be sure is
unique if the system is linear, exists. In this case, all policy
instruments must be employed in order to attain the
targets.
(c) M’--N+I<A,I, i.e., I<N, more equations than unknowns,
more targets than instruments. No solution exists. There is
now no set of instruments consistent with the specified
targets.
The general need for co-ordination of instruments is obvious
when we bear in mind that the values of the instruments to attain
given values of the target variables are found by solving a system
of simultaneous equations. For example, suppose that we have
eliminated the irrelevant variables from the model by algebraic
means, and that the model is then of the almost trivial linear form:
xI = d11u1 +dt2ug-t-dla
x2 = d21uI -[-d~u2 -}-d2a
Clearly, so long as the data, the dl.., are all non-zero, varying
J .either instrument will affect both target variables. Thus, as a general-
isation, we can say that the instruments must be co-ordinated: The
whole set of targets together determines the whole set of instruments
to be employed, and no single instrument can be attached to a
specific target. If, however, dll = o and d2z -~ o, we have the most
trivial type of system: u2 can be assigned to attain xt and uI can be
assigned to attain x2.
Consider now the policy problem with flexible targets. The
problem might then be of the form:
(2) Max W = W(xl, . .., xn) subject to (I).
We assume that the equations in (i) are non-contradictory and
independent. Since xt,..., xN must here be regarded as unknowns,
we now have in (I) M equations and M+Iunknowns, which means
that there must now be infinitely many solutions to the structural
equations (i). It follows that we can solve for the target variables
as functions of the I instruments, the us:
(3) x. = ~,(ul, ¯ ¯., u~); n = ,,..., N
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Substituting "(3) into (2) yields
w(xl, .... xN) = r¢(~1,..., ~N) = ~(u,..., u,)
Maxlmising W then requires, as first order conditions,
(4) Out --o; i---- x,..., I
(4) represents I equations which (assuming that (4) really has
a solution and that the second order conditions are satisfied) enables
us to solve for the I instruments which maximise (2) subject to (i).
Note that the number of equations in (4) adapts itself automatically
to the number of unknowns. Thus, in contrast to the case of fixed
targets, the policy problem with flexible targets is almost always
solvable.
In the above exposition of the flexible target problem we assumed
that the number of instruments available to the policyrnaker was
fixed in advance, and that I~aV. This leads to the question: Is there
an optimal number of instruments ? To give meaning to the question,
we assume that W really does have a maximum. The problem, then,
is to find a condition on the number of instruments which will
enable us to get to the summit of the welfare mountain.
For a maximum of (~) we require
OW(5)
--’~°x-- = o; n = i,..., N
But given the constraints (I), the feasibility of the xl,..., xN which
satisfy (5) requires that ~those xn also satisfy (I). Thus, what we
require for the attainment of a "bliss" level of welfare is:
OW
Ox--~, = o; aV equations in .IV unknowns, xx,..., xu.
f,,(xx, ¯ ¯., xu; rx, ¯ ¯., rs; ul ...., Ul; dx, ¯ ¯., dr) ----- o;
M equations, M--.N’+I additional unknowns.
We assume that these equations are non-contradictory and
independent. So we have oV+M equations, and aV+M--aV+I
----M+I unknowns. For a solution (i.e. for the "bliss" level of
welfare to be attainable) we require the number of unknowns to be
at least as great as the number of equations, or M+I>aV+M,
i
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which implies _t>_N; the number of instruments must be at least
as great as the number of variables entering the objective function.
Finally, consider the more general problem in which the politician
may not be indifferent regarding the instruments he employs. (In
this case, some policy instruments are also target variables.)
Eliminating the irrelevant variables by algebraic means, the
problem is then of the form:
(6) Max W = W(x1 ...., xu; u1, . .., ul) subject to
(7) f.(xl ....,xn; ul .... ,ul; d1 .... ,dK) = o; n = I ....,N
We can normally solve in two ways:
(a) Solve (7) for the x, as functions of the ui, insert the resulting
expressions into (6) yielding
(6’) W = I49(ul,..., ul)
and maximise (6’) with respect to u1 .... , ut. This will give us
I equations to solve, for the I unknown instruments which maximise
(6) subject to (7)-
(b) Alternatively, set up the Lagrangian
L = W(..)--~iNa.f.(. . )
As first order conditions for a maximum we then have:
OL
-- 0 (rt = I, . . ., N)Oxn
I
I
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OL
-- 0 (i = I, . .., I)
Ou~
OL
0~-, = o (n = i, . . ., N)
This procedure gives us (2N+I) equations to solve for the
2N+I unknowns, the xn, An, and uv Thus, even if the instruments
appear-in the objective function, in the case of flexible targets the
number of equations to be solved is always equal to the number of
unknowns so that (provided it is otherwise well behaved) the policy
problem is always soluble.
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If there are explicit boundary conditions on the use of instru-
ments, the problem becomes one of linear or non-linear pro-
gramming. Formal discussion of such problems, as well as those
involving uncertainty and optimisation over time, would take us
very far afield; the interested reader is accordingly urged to consult
some of the references cited in the text. Brief though it has necessarily
been, it is hoped that this appendix has given some readers a flavour
of the formal structure of an economic policy problem.
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APPENDIX II
The Leontief Study
IT was stated in the text that the open dynamic input-output modelof Leontief can cast some light on the appropriate time horizon
of the practical planner. The model is of the form:
xt= A,x, +B,+ x(Xt+ t--xt) +Y,
where the subscript t denotes time and
x = vector of total gross outputs.
A = matrix of flow coefficients. Any element, a i,
, 
of this matrix
¯ . . d
shows the amount of commodity z directly reqmred as a current
input to produce one unit of commodity j.
B = matrix of capital stock coefficients¯ Any element, hi..
, 
of
this matrix shows the amount of the ith commodity needed by tl~ jth
industry as new capital in order to facilitate an output increment
of one unit in theith industry. Capital goods produced in year t are
assumed to be installed and put into operation in the next year,
t+I.
y = vector of final demands, excluding investment demands.
The time subscripts attached to both structural matrices, A and
B, provide the possibility of using different sets of flow and capital
coefficients for different years, thereby incorporating technical
change into the dynamic model.
For a planning horizon of T years, we have a set of difference
equations which, defining Gt = I--A t +Bt + 1, are :
Goxo
-- Blxx = Yo
Defining Rt
°
GT--1XT-- I-- BTXT : YT-1
= G’~J1Bt, the system can be transformed to:
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We shall refer to the large complicated matrix of sub-matrices
as the dynamic inverse. Every element of this matrix is itself a
square matrix. If a delivery to final demand at some specified future
date is required, the dynamic inverse determines the gross outputs
of the various sectors necessary in the current year, and in every
intervening year. Phrased otherwise, we can say that it expresses
the gross outputs of any year as a function of the final demand
vectors of the given year and of all future years in the planning
horizon. It states, for example, that:
¯ ¯ ¯ R
-1Xo = G~Iyo+(RIG~I)y~-t- -t-(R~... r_lGr_,)yr_a,
Xl --= Gllyl -~- .... l- (R2. ¯ ¯ Rr- 1Grl-1) Yr- 1,
and so on. Thus, if planners set final demand targets for, say, the
next ten years, those targets will have implications for gross outputs
in the current year, and in all future years up to and including the
tenth.
What we are interested in is whether the coefficients of the final
demand vectors, i.e. of the y, are in effect, zero for years far into
the future. If, for example, we find that the coefficients relating
final demands in time periods more than, say, six years beyond
the base year, to the gross output vector of the base year, are close
to zero, then we can argue that the basic plan should have a time
horizon of no more than six years. That would be because final
demand targets for years more than six years into the future would,
in effect, be irrelevant to decisions made in the base year.
This model embodies the assumption that the state of the
economy in years beyond the end of the planning period is irrelevant
from the standpoint of decisions made in the base year. If the
planning period is a long one, the terms in the upper right hand
corner of the dynamic inverse may be small in magnitude, and since
it is likely that the plan will be revised before the end of the planning
period, the assumption just mentioned may not be as pertinent as
it at first appears. Whether or not the terms in the upper right hand
corner of the dynamic inverse are small in magnitude is an empirical
question about which we do have some information.
The empirical evidence of Leontief~ is that the dynamic inverse
is, in the present context, very nicely behaved. He constructed an
open dynamic input-output system with 52 endogenous industries
and computed its inverse on the basis of two sets of A and B matrices,
one describing the structure of the US economy in x947, the other
in 1958. A third system was inverted on the assumption that
1Wassily Leontief, op. cir.
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technical change occurred gradually over the years i947-x958. He
then let each of the components of the final demand vector for
x958 increase by one million dollars. In all three cases the dynamic
inverse turned out to be well behaved; all time series of which it
consisted converged quite rapidly toward zero. In some instances,
however, the convergence was much more rapid than in others.
These findings led Leontief to conclude?
In recent contributions to the pure theory of economic
growth the problem of the so-called ’terminal conditions’ has
attracted much attention. According to the evidence presented
above, the time horizon upon which we could base our plans
or make our projections should va?y from sector to sector. The
time-shape of the elements of the Dynamic Inverse that governs
direct and indirect requirements for the products of one
particular industry might be such that its output in a given
year depends primarily on the composition and the level of the
final demand vector of the same year. For another industry,
that shape might be such that the level of its output in a given
year reflects final deliveries, say, four or five years later.
If structure of the Irish economy were identical to that of the
USA, Leontief’s findings would lead us to conclude that the basic
plan of the practical planner should have a time horizon of about
six years. Reasons are given in the text why, in the case of Ireland,
it probably should be a little shorter than that.
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